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A B S T R A C T  
In the United States, a single piece of legislation, the Social Security Act, is the major vehicle 
through which the cash assistance to citizens is provided. This act contains many subprograms, 
programs so different in concept, administration and programmatic implication that many people 
do not know that the same piece of legislation makes them all possible. In this paper three 
programs~"social security, . . . .  unemployment compensation," and "public assistance"--are 
examined in a sociohistorical, sociocultural context. The roots of these programs are analyzed, 
their current operations outlined, and the policy problems currently confronting them are 
detaiIed. The ways in which the programs relate to the political mythology of the society is seen 
as important. Because of the continual conflicts arising out of the administration of public 
assistance, three special cases involving that program are mentioned. 
Introduct ion  
Paradoxica l  as it  may  seem, many  people  in the  Amer ican  and  in the in te rna t iona l  
communi ty  are not  aware  tha t  the A m e r i c a n  na t iona l  welfare s t ructure  is basical ly  
der ived f rom programs  made  possible  th rough  a single piece o f  legislat ion,  the act  
popu la r ly  known as the Social  Securi ty Act ,  and  its amendments .  One o f  the reasons  
this  fact  is no t  well known  lies in the ra ther  diverse na ture  o f  the  p rograms ,  and  the 
different pol i t ical  and  p rog rammat i c  evolu t ion  which has shaped  them since the i r  
passage.  This  s i tua t ion  provides  the pol icy  and  adminis t ra t ive  scholar  an  oppo r tun i t y  
to look  at  different approaches  to p rov id ing  social  welfare benefits, and,  in a g loba l  
way, assess some o f  the differences in outcomes.  One o f  the purposes  o f  this  p a p e r  is 
to under take  jus t  such an analysis and  assessment.  
A second purpose ,  and  one as impor t an t  as the ini t ial  one, rests in an a t t empt  to 
l ink the deve lopment  of  the different p r o g r a m  modal i t ies  with different elements in 
the value structure of  the social  system in which they operate .  P rograms  and  policies 
* Special thanks is due to Mrs. Shirley Roles, who made many useful conceptual and editorial 
suggestions. 
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do not spring fully developed from some policy-making Zeus. Rather, they are the 
result of elements contesting in the social and political structure. Numerous studies 
link policy and administrative outcomes to rather specific near-term causes (Minister 
X hates Minister Y, etc.) (Lasswell, 1965; Ch. 1; Donovan, 1967). Yet too often 
administrative and policy scenarios are repeated with a completely different cast of 
characters, leading one to think that sets of predisposing causes are at least as 
operative as precipitating ones. And although we are using the area of  income security 
and poverty relief specifically here, such an approach would be helpful in many 
different policy areas. Consider our national schizophrenia on the issue of  alcohol 
problems, for example, which has led to two constitutional amendments. Under- 
standing the cultural matrix is crucial for policy analysis. 
A Social-Historical Overview 
A detailed social-historical account of  poverty relief remains to be written (Klebaner, 
1964). But it is possible to outline some of  the key elements in the political culture 
which any income relief or assistance program would have to take into account. 
Three Hundred Years of Hostility 
Perhaps most salient here is the fact that the poor have been the object of  un- 
remitting hostility for several hundred years. In England, getting the poor to work was 
a central policy concern. (DeSchweinitz, 1943) Work, good for both society and the 
soul, was a central feature of  hatred of the poor. Somehow, it was felt that they were 
lazy and would not work. In the United States, one of  the first instructions of the 
Massachusetts Bay Company (1629) was that: 
Noe idle drone bee permitted to live amongst us, which if you take care of now at the 
first to establish, will be an undoubted meanes, through God's Assistance, to prevent a 
world of disorders and many grevious sins and sinners (Bruel and Wade, no date). 
The English Poor Law Reform of 1834 did nothing to change this attitude. 
Generally viewed as a repressive law, it established the principle of "less eligibility," 
which specifies that any person receiving assistance " . . .  shall not be made really or 
apparently so eligible as the situation (i.e., position or station) of the independent 
laborer of the lowest class" (DeSchweinitz, 1943, p. 123). In practice, this has come to 
mean that any money grant has to be below the lowest wage. At that time, the poor  
were sent to workhouses. Though old, the issue is not dead. A recent study shows 
that less eligibility still operates here in the United States (Tropman, 1975). The reform 
also argued that not only poverty was bad but pauperism, or the taking of help for 
being poor, was also bad. The poor were thus doubly disliked, for being poor and for 
receiving help. 
The importance of work seems to be crucial. It appears that the only government 
aid program which engenders acid hostility is public assistance--where people do 
not work or have some excuse (illness, for example) which is acceptable. A Report of  
the Illinois Legislature says: 
The cold, hard fact of life is that man works out of necessity. Man does not work because 
he likes work but because he has to work . . . .  If the government is going to feed, clothe, 
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provide a home and fire without the necessity of work, many people won't work. It 's 
that simple (Illinois, 1963). 
The Pierce Veto 
In England, the central government had taken some responsibility for the provision 
of relief, but in America, under the Federal system, this responsibility was left to the 
states. There was a strong feeling that what little relief would be given should be  
completely a local responsibility. The reluctance to have any responsibility for socia} 
welfare's devolution upon the Federal Government became clear to Dorothea Dix in 
1854. She had successfully convinced many state legislatures to make state provisions 
for the mentally ill. On the crest of  this success, she almost single-handedly convinced 
the Congress of  the United States to pass such a bill. This bill provided land which 
could be used to build mental hospitals. In a famous veto, President Franklin Pierce 
commented: 
It cannot be questioned that if Congress have the power to make provision for the 
indigent insane without the limits of this District, it has the same power to make provision 
for the indigent who are not insane; and thus to transfer to the Federal Government the 
charge of all the poor in the States (Bruel and Wade, no date, pp. III-DI). 
The Federal Government would not in fact enter the social welfare field until the 
1930s. It  is a credit to the prescience, if not the judgment, of  President Pierce, however, 
that he correctly foresaw the route events would take. 
Thus, in the 18th and 19th centuries the climate toward the poor was not sympa- 
thetic; it was harsh and judgmental. Titmuss has referred to this attitude as "meta-  
physical individualism." White and Fine have referred to the prominence of the 
"laissez faire" concept (White, 1958, p. 3; Fine, 1955). To be in need was the indivi- 
dual's own fault; society would help only in the most extreme cases. 
Private Charity 
To suggest that there was a generally hostile attitude is not to imply that nothing 
was being done to help. The predominant norm prevented government from taking 
much responsibility; and certainly anything more than minimal was too much. This 
situation pushed development of  relief programs into the private sector. Thus, 
special agencies for the poor developed in the private rather than the public arena. 
With this location of help, there also developed a group of people helping the poor;  
friendly visitors who saw themselves as having a vocation rather than being govern- 
ment employees. Both factors have had a lasting impact on social welfare. It  set the 
precedent that the poor need individual attention from individual persons, as well as 
money, and became the tradition out of which one of the Social Security Act programs 
- -publ ic  assistance--justified its concept of  caseload. In the United States, the private 
sector had, until the depression, the primary responsibility for programs of  poverty 
relief? 
1 By responsibility I do not mean that they were the only group providing money. The govermnent 
was providing cash. In 1890, the social welfare expenditures were 2.4~ of the gross national product 
(8318 million of expenditures). By t969/70 this proportion had risen to 15~. Rather, the private 
agencies were dominant in their conceptions of poverty causes and cures, and in the public eye. 
(Source: Social Security Bulletin, December, t970, p. 4.) 
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The Depression 
During the 1930s, the depression put such stress on private agencies' resources that 
there came to be a general feeling that something else should be done for those in 
need (Angell, 1936). The Federal Government, under President Roosevelt, was 
receptive. Politically, however, several developing strains of  thought had to be 
harmonized in any legislation. First, there was the notion that specific groups of 
people were "deserving" of aid. Second, there was the idea that it might be possible 
to "insure" against such disasters like losing one's job, or that one could insure 
against poverty in old age by paying in a little over a lifetime, like an annuity. Third, 
there was the group of charitable workers who had been heavily responsible for 
poverty relief since the late 1800s. Their concepts of the causes and consequences of 
poverty, and the appropriate structure of relief, could not be ignored. As it turned out, 
it appears their ideal was to create, through governmental action, a sort of giant 
private social agency, which would operate much like the social agencies of that time 
but with vastly augmented resources. And finally, there was the Federal system itself. 
Somehow, an accommodation had to be made between state and Federal interests. 
The Social Security Programs 
In this nexus of pressures, then, the Social Security Act was passed (P.L. 271, 74th 
Congress; approved 8-14-35; 49 Stat. 620). With its passage the Federal Government 
took on the responsibility of providing security against economic hardship for some 
designated groups of Americans. Such security was not to be provided in a single 
program, however. The climate of American opinion surrounded poverty, especially 
the Federal Government's responsibility concerning poverty, was too unfavourable 
to permit the "Family Allowance" plan being considered as in other countries. 
There was not the deep concern for social factors producing poverty which was to 
find its expression (and a set of  proposed solutions) in the Beveridge report in England 
(Friedlander, 1958, pp. 47-48). The American strategy was to make the poor "eligible" 
by categories. The strategy of the category system was to designate certain groups of 
needy for special legislative attention. 
In the act three basic programs were developed to meet the need for help and 
economic security. 2 The first two programs are "insurance" programs, for which a 
special tax is levied. The third program is a collection of various "assistances"-- 
called the Public Assistance Titles. As we shall see, even the name makes a difference 
in the legitimacy. 
Social Security 
The Social Security Program (OASDHI) is one which provides a fixed money 
payment for Old Age, Survivors and Dependents of the Insured person, and also 
provides medical care for older people, and in some instances for others. The 
locus of administrative control in the Social Security program is in Washington. It is 
2 There is a provision in the act for a grant-in-aid program for child welfare purposes. We will not 
discuss that program here. An interesting study, done at the time of passage by an academic who 
later had important policy roles is Social Security in the United States by Paul Douglas (1936). 
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a Federally administered program, and payments are made by Federal employees of 
the Social Security Administration. 
The Social Security Administration is decentralized by region, by districts within 
each region, and through the use of field offices within these areas. While the Social 
Security Administration employee is a Federal employee, it seems that an organiza- 
tionally localized professionalism has developed, similar to what happened in the 
Tenessee Valley Authority, and the Forest Service (Selznick, 1950; Kaufman, 1960). 
The growth of organization-specific techniques has been generated through in- 
service training, and is discussed in print (DeSchweinitz, 1961). 
Over the years, social security has secured a place on the American scene for itself. 
It  has not been under the same attack which has plagued the administration of  
public assistance, although recently, questions about its fiscal base have been raised. 
One reason for this relative freedom is, of course, its high quality administration. 
Policies are clear and are enforced across the board. A person is eligible for social 
security whatever his geographical location; there is no "residence requirement" as 
there was in the Public Assistance Program. The fact that it is a totally Federal program 
simplifies and consolidates the administration. Three other factors are important. 
First, everyone who is insured gets social security, regardless of his financial need. 
This provision has removed much of social security from the class of "aid to the 
needy" programs. A second and related feature of the program, which helps in the 
public relations, is that benefits have been determined on the basis of wage rate and 
on the number of quarters in which one was working under an insured occupational 
category. Thus, the benefits are tied directly to work. Finally, there is a special tax 
which Americans pay for social security, which is plainly marked on every pay 
voucher. This tax money goes into the Social Security Trust Fund, from which current 
benefits are paid. This trust fund supports the "insurance" concept and creates the 
image that "I  have paid in, and I deserve to get it back." The aspect of insurance-- 
indeed, the very name "insurance"--lends a legitimacy and aura of public acceptance 
to the Social Security Program. 
However, in 1974, three programs previously thought of as "welfare" programs, 
'Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind and Aid to the Permanently and Totally 
Disabled (O.A.A.; A.B.; and A.P.T.D.) were transferred to the Social Security 
Administration and are now administered there, under the title of Supplemental 
Security Income (S.S.I.). This transfer represents the first time that the Social Security 
Administration has administered a "means tested" program, and it has created some 
implications which can be considered later. Suffice it to say now that the program is 
Federally financed (as opposed to grants-in-aid to the states under the Public 
Assistance Administration) but the grants may be supplemented by the states either 
through the State Departments of Welfare or through the Social Security Administra- 
tion itself. In the case of state supplementation, and many states have chosen to 
supplement, the amount is purely a state decision. 
Unemployment Compensation 
The program of unemployment compensation is administratively unique. Under 
Title III of The Social Security Act, the Federal Government collects a tax (3.2 % on 
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the first $4,200 of workers wages) based on the employers' "experience" with un- 
employment-the more a particular employer "contributed" to unemployment 
(i.e. creates unemployment), the more tax he has to pay. Unemployment Compensation 
is not, however, a Federal program. The law provides that if the state has an Un- 
employment Compensation Program, then it can secure a credit of up to 90 ~ of 
the Federal tax. In effect, the law allows for a Federal Unemployment Compensation 
Program only if the state does not have one. The locus of control in the Unemployment 
Compensation Program is fundamentally in the states, with loose Federal supervision. 
The Federal law, administered by the Bureau of Employment Security in the Depart- 
ment of Labor sets up certain requirements which the states must meet if they are 
going to receive their rebate. These requirements are essentially: 
1. The payment of benefits through a public employment office; 
2. The deposit of state funds in an unemployment insurance fund managed by the 
Federal treasury; 
3. The right of unemployed workers to refuse jobs which do not meet prescribed 
standards without having the benefits withheld; 
4. The right of an unemployed worker to a hearing before an impartial tribunal if 
his claim for benefits is denied. 
These requirements are broad ones, they permit some considerable difference 
between the states. Although benefits are supposed to be "adequate" for "a limited 
period," there is wide latitude in interpretation of these terms. This situation arises 
because each state has had to pass its own unemployment compensation law, and thus 
there is ample room for the play of state interests. Under Title IX of the Social Security 
Act, the Social Security Administration makes grants to the states for 100% of the 
administration of the program. Both the state administration, and the Federal 
responsibility for paying for state administration, create potential loci of friction 
between the Federal and the state levels (Haber and Murray, 1966). 
While the specific titles of the Social Security Act make provision only for un- 
employment insurance, the program as it evolved has links with employment services. 
Haber and Murray note that: 
When the Social Security Act was passed in 1935, the desirability of coordination of 
unemployment insurance and the public employment service was taken for granted and 
made a condition for states receiving Title III grants (Haber and Murray, 1966, p. 419). 
Thus at the state level, two services are provided, employment counseling as well 
as an unemployment benefit. Thus state employment service workers, like public 
assistance workers, have a counseling job to do, but they have, like Social Security 
Administration workers, an insurance program to administer. They have not developed 
the bureau professionalism of the Social Security Administration, nor the identification 
with an outside profession (social work) of the public assistance workers. 
The Public Assistance 
The third set of programs funded under the Social Security Act is that called Public 
Assistance. Initially, there were three programs--Old Age Assistance (OAA), Aid to 
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the Blind (AB), and Aid to (Families With) Dependent Children (AFDC). In 1950, 
an amendment was passed which made provision for Aid to Permanently and Totally 
Disabled (APTD). The act provides that out of  general revenue funds the Federal 
Government  will make public assistance grants-in-aid to the states designed to help 
with the kinds of  problems suggested here. It  is a mutually contributory program; 
the states make only small contributions to each program, and the Federal Govern- 
ment is footing much of  the bill. Since these categorical programs do not cover the 
many situations which can place persons in financial need, there is a program of  
General Assistance funded out of  state and local funds to fill the gaps. a To qualify 
for aid, each state must submit a "state plan" as provided for in the Social Security 
Act to the Social and Rehabilitation Service, Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare. The plan must be in conformity with the act and subsequent interpreta- 
tions at the Federal level. Remuneration is made to the states in two parts. One type of  
rebate is for the actual grants made to clients. A second rebate reimburses the state 
for personnel costs, since certain types of  personnel, and certain client/personnel 
ratios are encouraged or required. 
I f  the state plan, or state action as it turns out, is not in conformity with Federal 
law and interpretation, then the grant-in-aid funds may be withheld by the Federal 
Government.  This step is a serious one, and has only occurred in a few instances. 
In at least one case (the "Jenner Amendment"  controversy) the law was changed to 
permit a state to do what it wished. 
Just as for the Unemployment Compensation Program, there are sizeable state 
administrations for public assistance, since the Federal Government itself does not 
make any payments directly to individual citizens. Basically, two forms of  assistance 
administration are used. In one method the state is the actual agent, and sets up field 
offices around the state. In the other method, the county acts as the agent, under 
supervision by the state. 
As in the Unemployment Compensation Program, two services are g iven- -  
financial help in the form of grants, and "services" in the form of personal counseling. 
In the Unemployment Compensation Program the counseling usually takes the form 
of  assistance in seeking and securing a job. In the Public Assistance Program, there is 
an attempt to make the services "professional" in a social work sense, and counseling 
may range over a broad variety of  personal topics. Every "client" is assigned to a 
caseworker. However, the concept of  services and payments, developed recently, 
divided workers into "service" and "assistance payment"  workers. 
The arrangements of  these programs have now changed. Under recent revisions, 
the Blind, Disabled and Aged Programs have been nmved over to the Social Security 
Administration, leaving Aid to Families with Dependent Children as the single 
public assistance. 4 
a It should be emphasized that '°General Assistance" is n o t  a Federal Program, nor does it receive 
any assistance from the Federal Government. 
4 There is not, however, completely firm agreement on the programs to which "assistance" refers. 
I am using it to refer to the program with that title. Others, however, would argue that SSI is a public 
assistance, even though it is now within the administration of the Social Security Program. I am not 
including other types of payments, such as medical payments here either. 
39 
Policy Problems in Income Relief Programs 
As might be expected, each of  the programs has a set of  policy problems unique to it~ 
Basically, in each case, these problems have to do with coverage, and benefit levels° 
However, the Public Assistance Program is somewhat unique in this regard because 
it suffers from a crucial lack of  public confidence and from a public hatred of  its 
personnel, which undermines its own efforts. 
Social Security Policy 
The first questions of policy which are involved in the administration of social 
security are of two kinds--(1) what shall be included within the scope of the program, 
and (2) how shall internal administrative arrangements be set up. Regarding the latter, 
perhaps the more minor issue, the questions about the proper mechanisms to maintain 
uniformity through the fields offices are prominent. These have been solved, to a 
degree, through multiple supervision and functional decentralization (Davis, 1950, 
pp. 298-299). 
The more serious policy issue relates to the kind of programs and the kinds of people 
involved in social security. Social security coverage has been continually broadened. 
The occupations covered have also broadened. The important question is, "Should 
everyone be covered, and, if not, where should we stop." The coverage has now become 
quite broad. It is perhaps a measure of the progress of  the Social Security Program 
that a new set of  crucial policy issues confronts it now. Basically, these new issues are: 
(1) a crisis in confidence about its fiscal integrity; and (2) the administration of  a 
means-tested program. 
In recent years, the social security payroll tax, which used to be quite minor, has 
climbed to a total of 11.7 % of  salary, half paid by the employer and half paid by the 
employee, to a limit of $15,300. These amounts are definitely not trivial, and have 
brought increased scrutiny to the Social Security Program. 
The potentially onerous level of the current tax is brought into sharper relief by the 
discovery that the Social Security Trust Fund will have more claims than funds, if  
current rates of expenditure are maintained with no increase in income. This "cash 
flow" problem results from both increased benefits packages and increased numbers 
of  claimants. Either the tax rate will have to be raised, or the upper limit on income 
taxed will have to be raised, or the Federal Congress will have to supply some General 
Revenue Funds or some combination of  the above alternatives will have to be 
developed to take up the slack. Whatever the alternatives chosen, social security will 
be more criticized and investigated than ever before (Richardson et al., 1975). 
The addition of the SSI program (paid for by General Revenue) has created a 
different type of crisis. While the fiscal crisis was external, the SSI crisis is internal, 
internal in the sense of staff. The Social Security staff hitherto have never administered 
a means-tested program. It has proceeded smoothly in Michigan, but has tested a 
staff basically trained in an orientation which is not one of meeting "need" (Bernard, 
1975). 
And the "need-based" addition to the social security system may, in time, become 
an external matter if it erodes the omnibus image that the country holds of the program. 
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Employment Compensation Policy 
Policy issues in the unemployment compensation program are also complex in 
nature. Essentially they relate to the level of payment and the nature of the experience 
rating. Many people believe the levels of payment should be raised. William Haber 
concluded that only Federal legislation will help. 
Arid it is clear, after many years of exhorting the states to increase their maximums, that 
no amount of urging by high officials of the Federal Government or anyone else is going 
to raise maximum benefits . . . .  It is clear that the maximums will be raised to adequate 
levels only if a minimum Federal standard is enacted (Haber, 1965). 
A second issue relates to the "experience ratings" provision, in which an employer 
is charged a tax on the basis of the amount he "contributes" to unemployment. 
Since this amount is determined by the number of people (his ex-employees) who are 
drawing unemployment compensation, there is much to be gained by a challenge. 
It would probably pay a large corporation to have lawyers challenge claims to 
unemployment compensation. Any claim which is disallowed is thus a reduction in 
the employer's "contributions" to unemployment (experience rating) and, hence, to 
this tax. The "experience rating" structure which was set up under some kind of  
"fair share" idea, has resulted in continual challenge by some employers to the 
claimant, independent of the claimant's particular justification. And while this pro- 
cedure may be judicially a fair one, it is also a time consuming and expensive one for 
both employer and employee. And because of different employment patterns in 
different industries, there is a question raised about the experience rating concept 
itself. 
These issues are not the only ones. There are questions about the level of tax, the 
base which is taxed, the length of time benefits should be given, the relationship 
between employment counseling roles and unemployment compensation roles within 
the state Employment Security Commissions, to mention a few. Yet overall, it appears 
fair to conclude that the program has more support than the Public Assistance 
Program. 
Public Assistance Policy 
Public assistance policy represents perhaps the most complex area of the three 
programs. Much of the onus distilled from the historical climate devolves on this 
program and the administrators must cope with not only the usual run of administra- 
tive problems, but also with the extra and special problem of public hostility and 
distrust. This negative public attitude not only augments the usual difficulties, but 
creates special and unique ones. 
State Plan 
Routinely, the public assistance administration has state issues to consider. As an 
intergovernmental program, issues of intergovernmental relations are always present. 
State and Federal government do not agree, and this is often reflected in controversy 
around the approval of the state plan (Bureau of Public Assistance, 1953). And since 
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the state has to make a regular appropriation to cover its share of  the assistance 
budget, the assistance program comes in for regular review in each state legislature. 
This review would be pro forma or minimal in many cases, but in the case of  assistance, 
the undercurrent of  public distrust and hostility has this regular opportunity to surface. 
Staff 
Another regular source of  difficulty lies in the staff area: who are appropriate staff, 
and what is their role. These questions involve issues of  professionals versus non- 
professionals. Assistance operates, as was mentioned, on a caseload concept. It was 
assumed, and was encouraged, that the caseworkers be people with MSW degrees. 
However, the arithmetic is such that there can never be sufficient MSW persons to 
handle the public assistance caseload. Many of the personnel are nonprofessionals. 
In 1965 there were 35,000 public welfare workers. Of this number, 1,500 have professional 
degrees and are members of the professional association. While this is a minority estimate 
because there are likely persons who are trained but not members of the professional 
association, it nevertheless presents a picture of the general relation (Morris, 1965). 
Indeed, the problem of sufficient "professional staff" is as old as the profession. 
Lewis reports in the Encyclopedia of Social Work that in 1893 only the Boston, 
Baltimore and Brooklyn Charity Organization Societies were able to assign friendly 
visitors to a significant proportion of cases (Lewis, 1971). 
Social workers also have clung tenaciously to the belief that more MSW workers 
would help reduce the rolls. There is not only no evidence on this point, but as it 
turned out, the assistance rolls were so far below poverty levels that increases were 
almost inevitable. In any event, having made the claim, social workers were not able 
to "deliver" lower rolls, and are now regarded suspiciously by state and federal 
legislators. 
Service v. Payment 
The professional-nonprofessional issue is linked to another policy issue: the nature 
of  the service required for assistance recipients. Social workers generally were 
identified with a "service" view of  assistance, in which the primary goal was personal 
counseling, and financial assistance was a "means to an end." Nonprofessionals were 
identified with the posture that money payment was all that was necessary, and one 
became involved in personal problems and difi~culties only if absolutely necessary. 
However valuable and important the distinctions here, neither group fell fully" within 
those limits. However, the identifications stuck in the public mind, and legislators are 
now saying that "high cost" professionals are not needed to give "service" of  an 
amorphous sort to a continually changing group of clients. Influenced perhaps by 
the style of  administration in social security and unemployment compensation, 
Congress has moved to separate income support from "service," to separate income 
support services from counseling services. However, it appears that the problems do 
not fall into easily separable categories, and tension has been created between 
"'payments" employees (who tend to regard themselves as somewhat lower on the 
organizational status ladder) and "social services" employees. 
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Cheating 
These regular administrative problems have an overlay within the system resulting 
from negative public attitude. People in general appear to be convinced that those 
who receive aid are cheating. Overall, the level of cheating is about 4 %. WiUiamson, 
in his study of attitudes toward the poor, found that his respondents believe that 
41% of the recipients tie (Williamson, 1974). In state after state, investigation after 
investigation goes on to find and reduce the number of people who are receiving 
public aid illegally. Things reached a low point in the "midnight search" program in 
California which created a public furor. Investigators were sent out in the middle of 
the night to inspect the homes of Californians who were receiving AFDC, to search 
for men (Reich, 1963). 
Rise in Rates 
During the period of the 60s, rates of welfare use rose dramatically (Tropman, 
1975). Between 1966 and 1971, the cases per 100 families rose from 2.4% to 5.6%, an 
increase of 133 %. The caseload rise led to increased criticism of the welfare system, and 
at least one major interpretation of the function of welfare as responsive to the urban 
riots. Welfare, Piven and Cloward argue, serves to keep the urban masses from full 
revolt (Piven and Cloward, 1971). However, in all the discussion about the rise in 
rates, two points are usually overlooked. First, there has always been a substantial 
gap between the program enrollees and the total number of people who might be 
eligible. One of the reasons that rolls can grow so rapidly is that persons who would 
be entitled to benefits, but have not applied for them, have begun making application. 
Second, while costs have indeed increased, the "value" of the average grant, taken as 
proportion of the per capita income in the state in that year, has decreased (Tropman 
and Gordon, 1974). 
Welfare Rights 
One feature which accounts for the apparent increased willingness to apply, and 
has been an important psychological as well as political factor is the development of 
a welfare rights organization. Welfare benefits have been one of the few areas of our 
society in which the actual beneficiaries are not organized to press for more and better 
benefits. Given that American society is almost characterized by such "interest groups," 
this omission is of interest. But in "the egalitarian decade" of the 60s, the rights of 
many groups who suffered from discrimination of one sort or another were pressed. 
In the welfare case, the group support for application, the sense that one was simply 
exercising a right rather than abusing society's generous impulses was surely an 
important factor. And for the first time, a group of welfare users (the clients) was 
available to make policy inputs along with the traditional group of purveyors (social 
workers, the American Public Welfare Association). 
Three Incidents in Assistance Administration 
It might be useful to describe some of the special problems in the administration of 
assistance through some incidents which have brought the Federal Government into 
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conflict with a state administration. Three cases will be illustrative--the so-called 
"Jenner amendment" case, the "suitable homes" provisions, and "Title XX." 
Jenner Amendment 
In the Jenner amendment controversy, the central issue was whether or not a state 
could publish the names of the people receiving relief (Cohen and Berman, 1952). 
Such a publication had been against the law since the 1939 amendments to the Social 
Security Act (p. 1,379, 76th Congress). The legislature of  the State of  Indiana passed 
an act which allowed this to be done, and hence did not conform to the Federal 
Statute. Funds were withheld from Indiana. While Indiana passed the bill, other 
states had not been idle, though they did not go as far. The state legislatures of  
Georgia, Illinois, Florida, Oklahoma, and Alabama urged Congress to repeal the 
section of the Social Security Act which forbade the publication of names. Several 
bills were introduced to this effect, including one by Representative Reed of  New 
York State and one by Representative Harrison of Virginia. They did not pass. 
Senator Jenner attached a rider to the appropriations bill for the Federal Security 
Administration (the early name for the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare) but it did not pass. Finally, a 1951 conference committee included the amend- 
ment on a minor tax bill. All it said was that a state should not be refused money 
for making public the names of relief recipients. The Federal Government had 
lost. 
Several of  the public attitudes mentioned are active here. The basic public attitude 
which permitted the Federal Congress and the various state legislatures to act as they 
did must be noted. Apparently it was an attempt to shame the recipients of relief into 
getting off the rolls. Again we see the public and the legislative bodies making the 
assumption that people are cheating, and that unless they are exposed to public 
shame, they will not get off the rolls. The Federal Administration took the view that 
the names of recipients should not be revealed--a position in accord with social 
workers' views of the matter--but  lost. 
This incident points out the difficulties in the Federal enforcement of  standards in 
the states. If  the states feel strongly enough, it is probable that the enabling legislation 
will be changed to the detriment of Federal standards. Of course, this kind of problem 
can come up only when there are specific Federal standards to meet, as in the case of 
grants-in-aid for public assistance. The standards in unemployment compensation, 
for example, are too broad and diffuse to permit much Federal enforcement. I know 
of  no case where funds for unemployment compensation have been withheld. 
It should be noted, however, that this conflict was not one of Federal Government 
versus state government, as such. The state administrators in Indiana were not 
particularly happy about the turn of  events. They themselves were not in favor of  
opening the lists to public inspection. What actually is involved here is a "government 
versus the public" controversy, which results in part from the "bad press" public 
assistance has. From this point of  view, the administrators are very vulnerable to 
public attack. For  example, Senator Byrd (D-Va.), "shocked" to hear about a number 
of persons on public aid in Washington, D.C., who were not technically "eligible," 
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instituted a "crackdown." Children in families which were refused grants wound up 
in an overcrowded home for children (Anderson, 1965). 
Suitable Homes 
These cases were not the only ones to come up. There is the so-called "suitable 
homes" case in Louisiana. A state law was passed providing that any woman who 
had an illegitimate child while on relief (AFDC) must prove that she was maintaining 
a "suitable home" to remain eligible. Grants to such women were terminated and 
they had to reapply. Although this provision received unfavorable editorial comment 
from the New York Times, and the Chicago Sun-Times, the Secretary of  Health, 
Education and Welfare did not find the state law incongruent with the Federal 
requirements. At one point, up to 2200 children were affected. 
The fear that there are "men in the house" of  women on relief, breaks out in 
another case--the California inspection case. In the State of  California, midnight and 
early-morning raids had been ordered on the homes of ADC recipients, to ascertain 
whether or not a man was in the household. Social workers covered the front and back 
doors of the dwelling, to prevent the man from escaping, should one be present. 
This procedure brought a rash of protests and resignations. One scholar adjudged it 
to be unconstitutional (Reich, 1963). Although the raids are in abeyance, the issue of 
the right to engage in such activity has never been settled. 
Finally, there are the myriad of local cases in assistance which become grist for the 
local press. One stalwart in Illinois recommended that the poor in Chicago be sent 
downstate to farms owned by the state, where they could grow their own food and 
learn to spin their own yarn for clothes (Anonymous, 1963). This plan does not seem 
to be much of  an improvement over the Nichols plan, advocated in 1932, under which 
restaurants would dump uneaten food into five-gallon containers, for which the poor  
would be eligible by chopping wood donated by farmers (Schlesinger, 1958, p. 172). 
Title XX 
Some of  the problems in Federal-State relations were thought to be solved as well 
as some loopholes in the Federal law plugged by the most recent addition to the Social 
Security Act, Title XX. This title provides money to the states for services. States must 
provide a plan for such social services, but the plan is not reviewed for content by the 
Federal government; it is only viewed with respect to its conformity to certain present 
categories (so much service must go to people receiving welfare payments, for example). 
Further, and unlike the provision in the 1962 amendments to the Social Security 
Act, it sets a total national maximum (2.5 billion) for social services spending, and 
sets a share for each state according to its percentage of the national population. 
Previously, Federal reimbursement had been open-ended, in the sense that the 
Federal government was required to match what each state spent in this area according 
to Federal formula(s), but the definition of what constituted services was very broad. 
In at least one way, this new title seeks to reduce Federal-State conflict and limit 
spending (through the national ceilings) without the Federal government becoming 
deeply involved in arguments with the states over what constitutes "service" to clients. 
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Policy Issues and Implications 
Considering the three programs individually and within the historical context makes 
possible a greater understanding of some of the problems and difficulties faced by 
these programs. It is immediately clear that, for historical and sociopolitical reasons, 
the insurance concept is much more acceptable, and its administration much more 
tranquil, than the concept of "public assistance" and its administration. This 
conclusion does not rest on an analysis of these three programs alone. Other programs 
for the "poor" have suffered much the same difficulty as the public assistance program. 
An early version of the Office of Economic Opportunity Program ("the poverty 
program") was developed in the 1930s and has now virtually gone out of existence 
(Baldwin, 1968). And the modern "poverty program" rose and fell within four years. 
Hence, successful policy in the area of income and poverty relief must take these events 
into account. If not, it is likely that future programs to aid the poor in the United 
States will suffer the same fate as the predecessor programs. It is not, however, 
exactly clear what "taking these events into account" would entail. Certainly we 
would be on relatively safe ground concluding that the insurance approach has more 
general public support. However, second thoughts indicate that the "insurance" 
approach also contains, and not by necessity, a benefit and allocations pattern which 
does not respond to the level of individual need. If one is eligible for OASDHI, one's 
benefit amount is determined not by need, but by whatever category of eligibility is 
appropriate. The same is true for unemployment compensation. We might, therefore, 
tentatively note the possibility that it is nearly universal coverage which is the important 
element, along with the insurance feature. It may be that the only way middle-class 
antagonism toward the poor can be muted is to include both groups in a benefit 
package in such a way that reduction of the benefits to the poor reduces benefits to 
the middle class as well. Additional explorations of the source of middle-class 
hostility, historically and contemporaneously, toward the poor may suggest more 
sophisticated alternatives. 
In terms of policy making, then, how does the government proceed? The answer 
to this question depends in part on the point of view. One sanguine opinion points 
to two ways in which the Social Security Board has proceeded to make policy. Hale 
argues that the board had three principles (Hale, 1957) 
1. That states should actually be involved in building Federal policy; 
2. That policy must be based upon "facts"; 
3. That policy decisions must be made known to all concerned. 
He further argues that the Social Security Board uses either a "common law" 
approach, or a "case approach" in coming to a decision. The implication of the 
presentation is that the policy making approach is decidedly a nonpolitical one, with 
the "facts showing clearly what decision should be made." 
Such a placid approach is not the only characterization available, however. Leon 
Lefson talks about the development of the Aid to the Permanently and Totally 
Disabled in California in decidedly political terms (Lefson, 1966). He feels that four 
factors influence the administration of a new law: 
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I. The political climate when the law was passed; 
2. The way the administration (both state and local) interprets that climate; 
3. The nature of  the relationship between the administration and the policy making 
board; 
4. And, for states which use the county form of assistance administration, the strength 
of the county supervisors. 
I would tend to agree with Lefson. While I would not wish to discount the importance 
of  the attempts to keep the administration nonpolitical, it is my conclusion that a 
political calculus always enters into the administrative calculus. An administrator 
cannot go ahead and develop policy with no regard for its political implications; he 
may soon find himself without funds. Especially in the administration of public 
assistance, the political aspects of the administration come to the fore because of  the 
relative lack of public sympathy for program goals. 
In this paper, then, we have attempted to suggest three very different types of 
administration which have developed to administer the programs under the Social 
Security Act. Each has its problems and its advantages, but we have emphasized how 
the grant-in-aid program makes control by the Federal level difficult, and often 
tenuous. The differences in administration have in part been explained by the 
different political climates surrounding the programs, and by the differing degrees of  
public acceptance and support which they enjoy. Other differences in professional 
staffing and interrelationships were suggested. Perhaps the most important conclusion 
one could draw from this comparative approach, for welfare administration as well as 
for other forms of administration, is that there are many ways to organize a program, 
and that an important part of the ultimate success of  the program will depend upon 
these initial organizational forms. However, from the point of view of  policy forma- 
tion, the question of how the organization should be set up is often a difficult one, 
with important political overtones. One ignores these overtones at his peril. 
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